



Frontiers of Civil Liberties. By Norman Dorsen. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1968. Pp. ccvi, 420. $8.95.
By ny account, Norman Dorsen has compiled a creditable record as
law teacher and lawyer. Under his direction, the Arthur Garfield Hays
Civil Liberties Program at New York University Law School has
pointed the way to substantial curicular reforms in legal education,
broken down the barrier between thought and action in the study of
law, and greatly enriched the literature of both legal scholarship and
civil liberties litigation. This book is a sort of diary of Professor Dor-
sen's work as law teacher and civil liberties lawyer from 1961 to
1968. The materials in it include papers, memoranda, and abridged
texts of briefs (mostly in the Supreme Court) written by Professor
Dorsen, as well as transcripts of conferences on civil liberties subjects
moderated by him with contributions by men with as diverse views
as Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale, Professor Paul Bator of Harvard,
Professor Caleb Foote of Berkeley, and NAACP Counsel Robert Carter.
The subject matter of these materials is broad-free speech, academic
freedom, religious liberty, criminal justice, the Supreme Court and
constitutional adjudication, and racial and economic discrimination-
and their quality is uniformly high. The book reflects well the issues
of civil liberty which were before the Warren Court in the years it
covers.
Were I to criticize at all, it would be only to suggest that the
selection of materials ought not to have been limited to the work of
one lawyer or group of lawyers. In considering the sit-in cases, for
example, the Solicitor General's amicus brief in Bell, Boule, and Barr




in the 1963 Term' is doubtless the most penetrating historical study
of Jim Grow filed with the Court and deserves to be given a wider
audience. But it is really unfair to criticize this book by scoring its
concept. Frontiers of Civil Liberties so effectively represents the best
in civil liberties litigation of the past decade that it provides an ex-
cellent basis from which to evaluate the work of the constitutional
litigator in this period and to ask what role, if any, he has to play in
the years just ahead. We lawyers owe ourselves this critical evaluation,
for the social events to which civil liberties law and lawyers address
themselves have moved from the relative obscurity of a lunch counter
in Greensboro2 or a loyalty oath in FloridaO to dominate public at-
tention and political discourse. Whatever this process may have done
for others, it has led me to take a more modest view than was fashion-
able several years ago of the constitutional lawyer's fitness to stand at
the center of the stage in the drama of important social change.
Lawyers, a sociologist once said, are the last of the generalists; he
meant that they were the last and only professionals to enjoy a com-
prehensive view of the society in which we live. He was wrong. Law-
yers could be generalists, if they wanted to; their craft and the posi-
tion it occupies in the lives of their fellow beings make it possible,
and perhaps even appropriate, that they should be. But lawyers are
by training and inclination "confined from molar to molecular mo-
tion. ' 4 Taking a perspective broader than the case at hand-and, in-
deed, only one side of the case at hand-is an art that most of them
never learn. To take one example, lawyers have for centuries been
making up history to fit this or that occasion, while judges, to estab-
lish premises for decision and justifications for new rules dressed up
in the guise of old, have put an imprimatur upon the crassest non-
1. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Griffin v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 130 (1964), Bar v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), Boule v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1954), Bell V. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), Robinson v. liorida, 878 Us.
153 (1964). The brief canvasses the history of Jim Crow and concludes that the actions
of the storekeepers and restaurateurs which led to the arrests of the petitioners.demon-
strators were part of a "commuhity-wide fabric of segregation . .. filled with threads
of law and governmental policy woven by the State through a warp of custom laid
down by historic prejudice." Id. at 143. The brief is an eloquent statement of the "prom-
ise of Negro freedom" developed by Arthur Kinoy in The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom, 21 RurEks L. REV. 387 (1967). See diso Douglis, J., concurring in Bell, 378 U.S.
at 242.
2. See NAIoAxAL AnvsoR-a Coz MsnlsoN oN CIVIL Di soaS, REPRT 226.28 (Bantam ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as KEneES CoMNIt'N REPORT].
3. CIrafmp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 US. 278 (1961).
4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes
made the remark in reference to common law judges, who he said were cabined by the
structure of the common law itself. That lawyers should be so confined is a product not
of the exigencies of their art, but of a self-induced smallness of vision.
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sense and called it history, or tradition. Lord Coke and the common
lawyers distorted our perspectives of English history all the way back
to Magna Carta and left us with myths from which, because many
of them are now enshrined in our jurisprudence and therefore safely
in the keeping of the courts, we will not be free short of revolution-
ary change. The reformers of the nineteenth century committed the
same offense with respect to English political history, and the process
continues to this day.
There is refreshingly little of this distortion of history in Professor
Dorsen's book, although the references to Magna Carta in the intro-
ductory chapter 5 and in the discussion of trial by jury0 betray an ac-
ceptance of the prevailing mythology concerning the historical im-
portance of the Charter.7 Lawyers are free in brief-writing to put
upon history any perspective that the court is likely to swallow, and
to rely on what some politically-motivated old lord once said in King's
Bench, the Exchequer, or the House of Lords as the authority for an
assertion of fact about an historical period remote from our own
and the old lord's. But when a scholar delineates the premises which
establish why a written constitution is preferable to an unwritten
one, or how we came to have trial by jury,8 he owes us more. I speak
emphatically not because Professor Dorsen's work gives me much
cause to do so, but because the extent of the malaise I am discussing
is demonstrated by a scholar of his attainments falling victim to it in
the course of a generally excellent work.
Lawyer's sociology is also a cause of some concern if the constitu-
tional lawyer is accepted as central to the making and applying of
the rules which are fundamental to our law-life. 9 Caleb Foote observes
in the course of a discussion reprinted in this book: 10
The great stoic philosopher Epictetus in one of his writings
imagined himself facing a wrestler. The strong man boasted to
him "See my dumbbells," to which the philosopher impatiently
retorted, "Your dumbbells are your own affair. I desire to see
their effect." We should like to be able to supply this kind of
standard to our subject, to be able to see beyond the decisions of
5. N. DORSEN, FRONTIERS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 8 [hereinafter cited as FRONTIERS].
6. Id. 234.
7. See Radin, The Myth of Magna Carta, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1060 (1947).
8. FRONTIERS 3-21.
9. There are some exceptions. Edgar and Jean Cahn, advocates, researchers, teachers,
and scholars, come readily to mind when one thinks of lawyers' sociology and fact.gather-
ing of high quality.
10. FRONTIERS 31.
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the Supreme Court and to gain a comprehensive picture of the
effect of the Court's custodianship of our civil liberties.
When we measure the effectiveness of a public health cam-
paign such as that against polio or venereal disease, we can say
that the incidence of the disease ten years ago when the campaign
began was such and such; that now it is so and so; that the dif-
ference represents a measurable decline; and thus by the use of
controls we may be able to attribute that decline to certain speci-
fic factors. Such an empirical validation is as important for civil
liberties as for science. We all know from sad experience that
any form of government can hold out the promise of a bill of
rights, and that what is critical is to look behind the promise to
see if its principles are available in practice to most clients of the
police and of the criminal law.
Professor Foote's comments suggest two observations about attri-
butes which the materials of Frontiers of Civil Liberties share with
much of the constitutional litigator's work in the years just past.
First, there is a distressing amount of conclusion-drawing from prem-
ises which lack empirical support. Second, the briefs and discussions
which led to the Supreme Court decisions of six, five, or even two
years ago do not give me the sense of a frontier's challenge: rather,
I realize how quickly the social events of the ensuing years have dated
the newly made rules, so that they can no longer guarantee the liber-
ties they promised to make safe. I am led to wonder whether the law-
yer's belief in "the law" as a universal solution to social controversy-
a belief glowingly and ringingly asserted in urging the making of new
constitutional rules and the revitalization of old ones fallen into
desuetude-was in error. I consider these problem in turn.
First, as to argument from apparent empirical premises, consider
the amicus brief from the right to counsel case, Gideon v. Wainwright,
included in Frontiers as chapter 13.11 The brief argues that providing
counsel will not increase costs to the state and might even lower
them. To support this assertion, it states that providing counsel in
every criminal case will reduce postconviction applications premised
upon "real or fancied trial injustices resulting from the lack of trial
counsel," thereby saving litigation costs, and that prompt provision
of counsel will help to eliminate delays in the administration of jus-
tice, presumably by releasing defendants on bail more quickly, thereby
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The brief in Gideon was written by Professor Dorsen andJ. Lee Rankin and is included in FIao~rras in abridged form aL 193.
895
The Yale Law Journal
saving detention costs. 2 Does the statement that costs will not increase
rest upon a calculation, even a rough calculation, of the number
of criminal cases tried each year and of the number of lawyers
available to try them? Has thought been given to the average cost
per hour of providing each criminal defendant with a lawyer, based
on an estimate of the number of hours it takes to prepare and try
the average criminal case?11 I doubt it, and the brief does not reflect
it. I am not criticizing the brief. It's a good brief, and I have written
just as broadly and just as baselessly in more than one case. But appa-
rently no lawyer in raising the cost issue in Gideon, and no lawyer
in dismissing it, bothered to find out just what he was talking about.
Both sides dealt in broad-gauge argumentative assertions. (The same
vice is often found in the discussions of church and state: someday,
someone will tell me in terms other than ringingly Jeffersonian-or
Madisonian-,-just what is the point of the establishment clause in
contemporary America; then, by figuring out what evils lurk, sensible
rules can be fashioned to deal with them.) Much of the book's dis-
cussion of racial discrimination in public schools, including de facto
segregation, is similarly uninformed by analysis of the tensions which
underlie disputes about schools in urban areas.' 4 The conference on
de facto segregation reprinted in the book was held just after Har-
lem exploded in the summer of 1964, yet it dealt with the problem
before it as one of applying Brown v. Board of Education'5 to the
problems of New York City's schools, including even (for some partic-
ipants) the psychological and sociological underpinning of Brown.
As stated in the introduction to the book, the conference made "the
tactical and policy choices which informed the briefs." What "in-
formation"? In retrospect how viable were the choices?
These defects are minor, however. I am principally concerned with
the view of the civil liberties frontiers and, impliedly, of the law-
yer's role on those frontiers that one might gain from the book. I
turn, therefore, to the second point raised above; do the briefs which
secured yesterday's significant decisions instruct us about today's
problems? On reflection, I think not, even when the briefs in question
are, like those preserved here, among the best of their kind. This con-
tention does not rest upon a distinction between "advocacy" and
12. FRONTIERS 207-09.
13. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES
IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (Silverstein ed. 1965) (3 vols.).
14. FRONTIERS 333.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"scholarship," for there need not be such a distinction, provided one
informs his reader when he is arguing and when he is explaining.10
Rather, I think the truly challenging questions, the "frontier" ques-
tions about law and liberty, arise from events that occur at some
remove from the forum in which constitutional cases are argued and
are answered only by careful study of these events.
Consider the Gideon brief: it demolishes Betts v. Brady,17 the
"special circumstances" counsel case which Gideon overruled. The
brief and the paragraph of introductory material ably and perceptively
inform the reader how a civil liberties lawyer goes about distinguish-
ing, and if he cannot distinguish, discrediting, a precedent which
stands squarely in the path of a new constitutional rule.18 At the con-
clusion of the abridged brief, there is a short paragraph summarizing
the Court's holding in Gideon and noting that the right to counsel
has since been extended to arraignments, police stations, and line-
ups.19 But the history of these developments, so quickly passed over,
is central to the meaning of Gideon; we cannot understand Gideon
unless we know the cases extending its rule into the police station.
Moreover, we cannot comprehend the frontiers of the right to coun-
sel issue unless we understand what lawyers discovered about crim-
inal justice when they went to the station houses and criminal courts
to represent indigents and unless we consider the practical effect of
Gideon and its progeny upon the fairness with which criminal justice
is administered. Now that a lawyer must be provided for everyone,
should we not inquire whether the malaise of our criminal courts
is more serious than the absence of counsel and of related procedural
rights? Perhaps the malaise extends to our use of the criminal courts
to sweep up society's refuse-to incarcerate those spen out by a
system increasingly unable to deal with its social problems except by
making their more violent (or, as in the case of public drunkenness,
aesthetically displeasing) manifestations the subject of punishment.
Or consider school segregation, housing discrimination, and sit-
ins. The documents this book contains concerning these issues are a
1963 manual for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund field
16. I am, in principle, in accord with the suggestion of Justice Douglas that law
review authors representing special interest groups identify themselves as such when
writing in legal journals. See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WAsH. L
REV. 227 (1965).
17. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
18. FRoNTERs 193-210.
19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (196);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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workers entitled "Demonstrations: How to Protest Within the Law",20
the transcript of a conference on de facto segregation whose partic-
ipants were civil liberties lawyers and law professors, 21 an American
Civil Liberties Union amicus brief in a voting discrimination case, 22
a 1967 paper on discrimination in private schools, 23 and a 1961 paper
on antitrust law aspects of housing discrimination. 24 Material of this
character cannot trace the frontiers of the questions it considers. In
part this is because later legal developments qualify, modify and
require re-evaluation of arguments in an area such as racial discrim-
ination where demands and the manner in which they are presented
are quickly changing. Thus, in the material on sit-ins, there is no
mention of Brown v. Louisiana20 and A dderly v. Florida2 G, concerning
de facto segregation, no mention is made of the implications of the
Hobson case,27 the recent statutory28 and judicial29 changes in voting
law are not analyzed; and the Supreme Court's revival of a fair
housing law dating back to Reconstruction is not discussed.30
One ought, however, to raise questions even broader than those
posed by subsequent litigation and legislation. The Court's decisions
are rendered in specific historical contexts. To take an example,
the holding in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill3' that the prosecution
had "abated" is express recognition that historical events, here the
passing of a statute, had overtaken the issues in the case before the
Court could confront them. In many other ways, as well, the pressure
of events outside the Court has defined and redefined the frontier
problems for courts and lawyers.
The first lunch counter demonstration at Greensboro, on February
1, 1960,32 no longer looks to us as it did at the time. Today we view
it through the smoke and flame of Harlem, Watts, Newark, Detroit,
Washington, D.C., and scores more cities. Careful distinctions about






25. 383 US. 131 (1966).
26. 385 U.S. 39 (1966), discussed in Kipperman, Civil Rights at Armageddon-The Su-
preme Court Steps Back: Adderley v. Florida, 3 LAW IN TRANsmoN Q. 219 (1966).
27. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
28. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. II, 1965).
29. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). And see Judge Wis-
dor's devastating opinion in United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.La. 1963),
aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
30. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
32. See KERNER COm'm'N REPORT 226-28.
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accommodations, seem somehow less than adequate to these events.
The litigator who, after reviewing his work, can tell us only that we
must bring new lawsuits in the mold of yesterday's 33 should be asked
whether he really believes his solution can adequately deal not merely
with demands for justice grown more insistent of late, but with a
society which, as the Kerner Commission found, is permeated with
"white racism."34 In short, the liberties declared by the Supreme
Court cannot be understood from an examination of the briefs and
conferences that led to them. To some extent this is because the
conclusions these materials advance do not rest upon empirical data.
But apart from this we can understand the frontiers of civil liberties
only by following a rule from the moment of its birth in the Supreme
Court to its impact upon those for whom is was intended, thus deter-
mining how far it goes toward solving the problems to which it was
addressed. We might then ask whether the problem was properly
defined in the first place, or whether a different rule ought not
to have been sought. We might even ask whether the problem can be
solved by orthodox litigation strategies conducted within the frame-
work of contemporary constitutional doctrine. This point is, I sug-
gest, all the more urgent because today blacks in the cities and youths
on the campuses are asking whether the legal system can accommodate
just demands, whether it can even redeem the promises it makes.
Take, as an example, the 1968 disturbances at Columbia University
and the Cox Commission Report. 35 The authors of the Report con-
cede that Columbia was permeated with cynicism, impersonality, and
arbitrariness; they admit that the institution's defects were so great
that one could understand, though not condone, the acts of the
students who rebelled. While the Report does not concede all of the
students' allegations against the university, (and one would not expect
it to), it does carefully document Columbia's self-proclaimed Mani-
fest Destiny to expand into Harlem, the community be damned. It
is difficult to imagine how lawsuits could be fashioned to bring the
trustees and administration to account for their accumulated mis-
deeds. Yet the values for which the students fought at Columbia are
concerned with the most fundamental issue before us today: the
power of the people to control the decisions which determine the
33. FRoNtERs xxi: "Mlt may be years and even decades before persistent efforts crum-
ble the illegal resistance and secure rights that previously were won only on paper.-
34. KEIRNER Co M'N REPORT passim.
35. FACT-FNDOG COMMISSION APPoNTED To INVEsTIGATE THE DisrtunAcEs AT COLUM-
BnA UNtvERSrrY IN APRM AND MAY 1968, CRIsiS AT COLUMBIA (195).
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content and rhythm of their lives and to call to account the wielders
of power in and out of government. If a lawyer had participated in
the events at Columbia, he would perhaps have helped the students
to frame their demands in the rhetoric of existing legal principles to
the extent that this could have been done. To the extent it could not,
he might have used his talents to define the kind of assertions about
social organization which were implicit in the students' demands for
change; in this role he would have been developing a counter-jurispru.
dence, or a jurisprudence of insurgency, elaborating justifications for
conduct which is outside the law as it exists and is interpreted today.
In addition, the lawyer-participant in the Columbia events would
have attempted to organize an effective legal defense for the movement
for change. He would not necessarily have defended the participants
in court, however, for one consequence of large-scale and significant
conflicts of the Columbia variety may well be that the participants
will acquire a deeper understanding of the principles at stake than
they will trust a lawyer to have, so that they (or some of them) will
want to defend themselves at trial.
Another possible legal response in the Columbia situation is "affir-
mative action"--making a number of the protesters plaintiffs and
placing their demands before the courts for decision. One difficulty
with this tactic is that the constitutional and legal principles which
can be invoked in such a suit cannot meet the students' central
demands. Also, the manner of the students' protest and the breadth
of their demands are often so repellant to the average judge that
their lawsuit is likely to be dismissed out of hand. 0 Finally, should
the suit survive a motion to dismiss, there is an unfortunate tendency
for a lawsuit of this kind to acquire a life of its own, possibly becom.
ing unresponsive to and independent of the goals of the movement
it seeks to serve. It tends to become the center of the movement and
even its purpose. In some contexts, it is wise for a lawsuit to play a
central role; lawsuits for desegregating schools and public facilities
were the principal organizational and political method for ending
racial discrimination in the South throughout the decade after Brown
v. Board of Education. In the context of a situation like that at Colum-
bia, however, when a lawsuit fills this central role and then is tossed
out of court by an angry district judge, the defeat is debilitating
and seems more important than it probably is.
36. One can say this with some confidence in the case of Columbia, since the lawsuit
was dismissed out of hand. Crossner v. Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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I have dwelt upon Columbia because the issues which the students
raised and the institution against which they rebelled were more lim-
ited in scope and thus more easily comprehended than those that
are involved when the residents of our city ghettos unite to seek sig-
nificant social change. But here, too, the lawyer must anal)ze the
demands being made and attempt to redefine them in terms of the
fundamental consitutional and democratic values which he a assert
on behalf of clients. He can further assist those pressing demands by
assessing the impact of particular tactics upon the government and
its agencies and by charting the extent to which governmental in-
stitutions can accede to these demands. His roles as advisor concern-
ing the law as it is and advocate for the law as it should be do not
exhaust his capacity for useful service. The lawyer who claims a
place on the frontiers must listen to the voices of the people on the
streets and cast their demands as claims for justice in a jurisprudence
of insurgency.
I am suggesting, really, a new style of life and work for lawyers,
rooted elsewhere than in the law's traditional mythology. We must
take the Bill of Rights out of never-never land. Once upon a time
there was the American Revolution, and then came the Constitution
and some rights by amendment to it. Then there was a Civil War, re-
sulting in many statutes and some explicit promises of freedom, duly
enshrined in constitutional amendments. The historical experience out
of which the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments were
fashioned was concrete and real to the authors of those amendments;
not so to us. Instead, we rely upon dim and distant historical perspec-
tives, and increasingly consider the rights themselves as abstract con-
cepts and play intellectual games with them. Define, redefine, decide,
distinguish, overrule, and dispute are the operative terms in this
process. Is it any wonder that at two place in his History of Western
Philosophy Bertrand Russell puts theology and law together as kindred
intellectual disciplines?37
While the process of abstraction has gone on, the society for which
the abstractions were designed has fundamentally changed. Unfor-
tunately, lawyers and judges know and take account of the changes
in far too many cases only by virtue of their own limited sets of
experiences. This state of affairs can not continue. Lawyers must
understand the life-styles of those who make these insistent claims for
justice. First, the lawyer must make legal and tactical decisions in
37. B. RussFL, A. HISToRY OF VEsnERN PHILOSOPHY 199 (1945).
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the light of events around him. More important, he must assist in
the fashioning of a new jurisprudence which gives meaning, content,
force, direction and coherence to the demands of the young, the poor,
and the black discriminated against. As lawyers of this new genera-
tion leave the law schools to represent those who are pressing for
social change and who have been virtually unrepresented until now,
the experiences they share with their clients will give them insight
into the principles of social order which alone will accommodate
their clients' interests. Some of these principles can be advanced by
lawsuits cast in the traditional mold. Some require strategies designed
to influence decision makers other than courts-legislators, admin-
istrators, city officials. Others can be made into defenses in criminal
cases when demands for change confront unyielding authority. Still
others can be fashioned into jury speeches. There will yet remain
some principles which cannot be accommodated within the system,
and which await more fundamental change in our social condition
and a return to the equilibrium of opinions and institutions of
which Shelley spoke so eloquently.38
We will learn to what extent the law can serve people's interests
and where it will betray them. I do not know where this process will
end, nor what discomfort we shall endure before it has run itself
out. I venture only that the frontiers are not in the courtroom any
longer, if indeed they ever were.
38. "The great writers of our own age are, we have reason to suppose, the companions
and forerunners of some unimagined change in our social condition or the opinions
which cement it. The cloud of mind is discharging its collective lightning and the equi-
librium between institutions and opinions is now restoring, or about to be restored."
Shelley, Preface to Prometheus Unbound, as quoted in G.D. TomsoN, AESCIYLUS ANt)
ATHENs 344 (1st ed. 1941).
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It's Academic
Ralph S. Brown, Jr.t
The Academic Revolution. By Christopher Jencks and David Riesman.
Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, Pp. xvii, 580. $10.00.
This is an important and exasperating book-important because in
it two highly competent critics severely but sympathetically examine
American higher education; exasperating because it is immoderately
long and is a confusing mixture of hard data and avowed impression-
ism. It is full of remarkable insights, as we have come to expect from
David Riesman, and also full of near-gossip, which we also expect, and
accept sometimes with relish and sometimes with annoyance. These
attributions of Riesman characteristics are not intended to slight
Jencks, who, we are told, did most of the writing. Since the collabora-
tion has been an extended one, Jencks, I take it, has come to think
and write rather like Riesman. He could have far worse models.
The "Academic Revolution" that the authors are describing is
something much less sensational than one's linking of the title with
current headlines would suggest. It is not about tie uprisings of stu-
dents, although the authors deal with this phenomenon in a calm and
sensible way. Their academic revolution is simply the "rise to power
of the academic profession."' For those who are inclined to take it for
granted that the professors have power in the academy, the term
"revolution" may seem a little strident. No matter. The authors do
have a transformation to report-a transformation of the eighteenth
and nineteenth century college, which was sectional, sectarian, and
dominated by presidents and trustees, with the former drawn largely
from the clergy and the latter being first under clerical and later under
business domination. None of these worthies, nor the nineteenth cen-
tury faculty, were professionals in the way that Jencks and Riesman use
the term. They remind us that they are adhering to
a rather special sense. Unlike many people, we do not regard an
occupation as a profession simply because it requires advanced
training or expert knowledge. We use the term only to describe
an occupation that is relatively colleague-oriented rather than
client-oriented. Professionalization in our lexicon therefore im-
- Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Yale Law School. A.B. 1935,
LL.B. 1939, Yale University.
1. C. JENcKs & D. Rirs.AN, THE Ac.Asr.tc REVOLUno.N xiii (1968).
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plies a shift in values, in which the practitioner becomes less con-
cerned with the opinion of laymen . . . and becomes more
concerned with the opinion of his fellow practitioners .... More
specifically, . . . professionalization means that the practitioners
seek the exclusive right to name and judge one another's mis-
takes.... [A] profession is akin to a guild or even a club.2
This definition comes in a chapter which discusses other professions
and the incorporation of their training into the academic system. But
the definition is equally applicable to professors of the arts and sciences
(with the interesting difference that most other professions nowadays
protect themselves by a system of formal licensing, while academic
people still do not, except to the extent that the Ph.D. is in effect a
license to teach and to do research in higher education, although not
yet an exclusive one).
The author's thesis, then, is that the academic profession has suc-
ceeded in shaping higher education in its own image. The modern
university is primarily an institution for training more professionals,
with the graduate school at the center, and the less academic profes-
sional schools clustering closely around that nucleus. Four-year col-
leges that lack graduate schools accept the "university colleges" as their
dominant models. Thus, at institutions like Oberlin, Swarthmore, and
Reed the vast majority of students are trained for and go on to grad.
uate and professional schools. The modern version of liberal arts edu-
cation for its own sake-general education-has its strongholds and
defenders, but a commitment to general education is more likely the
rationalization of an institution that can't make it as a "university
college."
This enormous machine, that stamps out universities as alike as
automobile bodies, has not yet, to be sure, succeeded in displacing
all other models from the market. The authors devote more than half
the book to description and analysis of some of the other models that
co-exist, sometimes vigorously, sometimes vestigially. They consider the
locally-oriented colleges (as all colleges once were) which, in the form
of the two-year community college, are burgeoning madly. A new one
every week is the dramatic way to put it; fifty or sixty new ones every
fall is the fact-startling no matter how you say it. Besides taking care
of those who seek vocational training or a part-time education, the
community colleges include among their constituencies those parents
in social groups not yet willing to let their children go away from
2. Id. 201-02 (footnotes omitted).
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home, the poor, for whom subsistence away from home would make a
critical difference, and, not least, politicians who have caught on to
the rewards of creating a public college in every community. Then
there are the women's colleges (declining), the Protestant colleges (de-
dining), the Catholic colleges (not declining, but struggling in the
coils of modernization), and, most mournfully, the Negro colleges.
The chapter on the Negro colleges was published earlier, and al-
though it appeared in a journal that I would suppose to be no more
widely read than this one, the Harvard Educational Review, it created
a storm not unlike that which was brewed by Moynihan's "Report on
The Negro Family."3 This chapter (mildly tempered in response to
the winds of criticism) is typical of other descriptive parts of the book.
That is, it is a mixture of empirically established conclusions and
bluntly subjective judgments, of wounding put-downs, and compas-
sionate empathy. No matter how it is phrased, it touches a sensitive
nerve when, after noting less than a dozen institutions that are "near
the middle of the national academic procession," Jencks and Riesman
assert of the rest-"some 50 relatively large public colleges and about
60 small private ones"-that, "[b]y almost any standard these 110 col-
leges are academic disaster areas."4 The authors elaborate fully and
painfully on the coerced pattern of external servility and internal
autocracy of the Negro colleges, on their desperate poverty and even
more desperate illusions. But they do not simply write them off. They
devote many earnest pages to suggesting a mission for them. Consis-
tent with their major thesis that American higher education is being
pressed into a common mold, and that this is not always a good thing,
they urge the Negro colleges to give up being "third-rate imitations of
Harvard" and to strike out in new directions. But they have little
expectation that this will happen when the standard academic model
is so fashionable. "America's Negro colleges are the products of white
supremacy and segregation," they conclude, and "[t]he malignant con-
sequences of this vicious tradition" increase the difficulties of break-
ing out of it.
The general impression that emerges from these chapters on institu-
tions that are not stamped from the "university college" model is that
there is still a good deal of diversity in American higher education.
8. US. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEmncii, TUE NEpo
FAzmy: Ti CASE FOR NATIONAL AanON (1965).
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But it is a diversity that does not win high marks on a qualitative
grading system. If small private Negro colleges are inferior, can any-
thing more be said for the general run of small Catholic women's col-
leges, except that they meet a demand from certain sectors of Catholic
parents who want their daughters kept virginal and devout? Still, satis-
fying a demand (the Negro colleges probably do not) is a measure of
performance that should be seriously regarded. The varieties of higher
education, largely untrammelled by monopolistic restrictions on either
entry or survival, create a fairly open market. It is an imperfect mar-
ket in significant respects, however, both in allocation of resources and
availability of information. The economic and social consequences of
these imperfections are the subjects of two meaty chapters that to a
considerable extent are separate from the rest of the book.
One is on "Social Stratification and Mass Higher Education;" 7 the
other deals with "Class Interests and the 'Public-Private' Contro-
versy."8 The chapter on "Social Stratification" argues painfully and at
length that class structure and social mobility aren't changing much in
American society, and that the extraordinary enlargement of oppor-
tunities for college education works chiefly to support the pretensions
of the middle class and to provide a buffer against decline in status
for the children of the upper-middle class (since they can make their
way through the system even if they do not have great ability). Both
groups have little trouble in meeting the costs of higher education
and getting to college. While the vast increase in public institutions
with low tuition makes it easier for the poor to go to college, there is
still a subsistence problem. Scholarships tend to be spread wide and
thin. Yet the first quintile of the children of the poor (in terms of
apparent ability) now get to college somewhere. It is the second quin-
tile, the authors assert, that could be college-educated but is not. A
greater concentration of aid would improve this situation. Beyond the
question of who gets to college, college education supports the status
quo in a different fashion by the way it confers prestige. "Regardless
of price . . . low income families send their children to poorer, less
selective, less prestigious colleges . . ,
If the system of higher education does not markedly enhance mobil-
ity, this, the authors point out, is not necessarily a bad thing. "A
mobile, fluid society in which men move up and down is simulta-
7. Id. ch. 3.
8. Id. ch. 6.
9. Id. 139.
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neously a competitive, insecure, and invidious society. The more we
have of the one, the more we will have of the other."10 Even if col-
leges attract more students from the lower strata, there will still be no
more room at the top. "The 'best' colleges are 'best' precisely because
they are competitive and exclusive. If they got more applicants they
would not expand appreciably to accommodate demand, for that would
jeopardize their elite standing.""
The chief difference that the authors find between public and
private institutions is that some private institutions, though under in-
creasing financial strain, continue to strive for limited enrollments
and students. Against the swollen and indistinguishable public institu-
tions ("the only small public institutions are those that cannot get
more applicants"), the authors urge the case for preserving the dis-
tinctiveness and standards that the leading private institutions seek
to maintain. But the financial inequality between public and private,
as we all know, is increasing. Pouring tax money into public institu-
tions is a form of middle-class insurance. "Everyone pays into the
kitty. Then families whose children stay in school win; families whose
children drop out lose."'13
The basic flaw of the college educational system is inequality: first,
the inequality of resources available to students who, by widely ac-
cepted criteria, ought to be able to go to some college, or even go to a
good college; second, inequality between types of institutions. One
remedy which the authors suggest almost casually is that much more of
the large subsidies to higher education should go directly to the stu-
dent, to be taken back in tuition by the institutions that the students
choose. This is a proposal that has growing support. It is reflected, as
this review is written, by the recommendations of the Carnegie Com-
mission on Higher Education. Such proposals are automatically op-
posed by spokesmen for the public institutions. The implications for
control of higher education, if it is the students who decide where the
money will be spent, are rather chillingly explored by Irving Kristol
in a recent essay which doubtless was (and should have been)
widely read, because it appeared in the New Yorh Times Magazine.'4
On the other hand, Jencks and Riesman, realistically assuming a mix-





14. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 49.
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suggest that there is no "foreseeable danger that student tastes will
play too large a role in determining institutional priorities."'i
The readers of this Journal almost without exception have a concern
with higher education-as alumni, as parents, as taxpayers. One who
made his way through The Academic Revolution would emerge both
bewildered and better informed. He might agree with a recent
journalist's suggestion-it must have been Russell Baker's-that the
thing to do is to give everyone a B.A. on graduation from high school.
Then we could get rid of a lot of unwilling scholars-and perhaps
wind up with an academic environment that was entirely and suffocat-
ingly cast in the academic-professional mold. But if most readers of this
Journal will not read The Academic Revolution, they will neverthe-
less be influenced by it. It is a book that, despite its faults, has so much
substance and so many ideas (impossible to convey in a review) that




The Quality of Inequality: Urban and Suburban Public Schools.
Edited by Charles U. Daly. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Pp. 160. $2.45. Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal
Educational Opportunity. By Arthur E. Wise. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. xiv, 228. $9.00.
The "opportunity" for education, the Supreme Court asserted in
Brown v. Board of Education, "is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms."' The Court was not explicit, however,
in defining the nature of the equality that the Constitution required.
Clearly, classifications which deliberately distinguished on the basis of
race were for that reason unconstitutional. But was racial discrimina-
tion the sole measure of equal educational opportunity? Must the state
15. C. JFNcKs & D. RIESMAN, supra note 1, at 290.
t Instructor, Harvard Graduate School of Education; Acting Director of the Law andEducation Center, Harvard University. B.A. 1965, Amherst College; LL.B. 1968, Harvard
University.
1. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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spend equal sums of money on each pupil? Must it provide equal re-
sources? A different set of issues was raised by the Court's citation of
studies which demonstrated the psychological damage attributable to
segregation. Was the Court implying that segregation was unconstitu-
tional not only because it was morally abhorrent but also because it
adversely affected chances for educational success? 2 Was the Court hint-
ing that equal educational opportunity could be attained only when
every student had an equal chance at educational success regardless of
race or class or family background?3 Might this not require unequal
expenditures and facilities for different kinds of pupils? Resolution of
these questions matters greatly, for determining what the state's obli-
gations are will affect how much money is raised for education, and in
what fashion that money is raised, as well as how the state allocates
money, teachers, and students among its schools.
Many of these issues are or recently have been before the courts. The
constitutionality of tracking-differentiated curricula for students of al-
legedly different ability-was put in doubt by Judge J. Skelly Wright's
decision concerning the Washington, D.C., public schools. 4 Parents in
Wyandanch, New York, have sought to dissolve their predominantly
black school district and parcel its students among the surrounding
whiter and wealthier jurisdictions. In Norwalk, Connecticut, two civil
rights organizations have sued a city school board, demanding that stu-
dents be bussed into as well as out of the black community, to assure
that neighborhood schools do not become a white-only phenomenon.5
Suits in several states have challenged the formulae for apportioning
state aid to local school districts.6 These lawsuits, others like dem, as
2. See the discussion in Brown of "a feeling of inferiority" generated by segregation.
347 US. 483, 494 (1954).
3. James Coleman expands upon this point in The Concept of Equality of Educational
Opportunity, 38 HARV. Enuc. Rxv. 7. 16-22 (1968).
4. "Any system of ability grouping whid . . . fails in fact to bring the majority of
children into the mainstream of education denies the children excluded equal educational
opportunity and thus encounters the constitutional bar." Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F. Supp.
401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967).
5. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1967; id., July 26, 1968 (Wyandanch); Norwalk Hour, Sept.
17-27, 1968 (Norwalk).
6. See Board of Educ. v. Mfichigan, No. 103342 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. 1968). In
Mcnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afJ'd sub. nor. hcInnis %'. Ogil.ie,
37 U.S.L.W. 3350 (Nar, 24, 1969), the District Court rejected plaintiff's contention tat
Illinois's formula for apportioning state aid was unconstitutional. The court upheld the
.'rationality" of the aid apportionment formula, denying plaintiff's contention that "need"
-the criterion proposed by the plaintiffs-was the only constitutionally permissible basis
upon which to apportion aid. The court rejected plaintiff's claims on the independent
ground that they were "unjusticiable," because the court could not identify standards
by which to test constitutionality. These difficulties aro= in large part because
of the way the suit was framed. Nonetheless, a California suit seeking on different grounds
to overturn that state's aid apportionment formula was dismissed on the authority of
Mclnnis. Serrano v. Priest, - Cal. App. 2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1969).
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well as legislative proposals, whether seeking centralization or decen-
tralization, bussing, cross-bussing, or neighborhood schools, allocation
of resources based on numbers of students, or allocation of resources
based on kinds of students, all seek equally effective educational op-
portunity for the students concerned. Yet at times these activities con-
flict, pushing states in different directions, and suggest the need for
greater clarity in defining equal educational opportunity.
The Quality of Inequality7 represents an attempt to cope with these
issues. Since the contributors include social scientists, politicians, and
lawyers, the book offers promise that it will deal with the issues both
in depth and breadth. More important, the book's central essay-"The
Constitution and Equal Educational Opportunity," written by Arthur
Wise-focuses on a novel and potentially revolutionary view of the
state's constitutional obligation to provide equal educational opportu-
nity to all students in the state." It finds that disparities among schools
in the allocation of resources for local education violates the equal
protection clause, and urges judicial action to overhaul existing sys-
tems for collecting and disbursing public education funds.
Wise's thesis, more fully stated in his book, Rich Schools, Poor
Schools,9 is seductively simple. (1) Great disparities in educational op-
portunity, which he defines in terms of expenditures for education,
exist among communities within a given state.10 (2) The cause of these
disparities is the state's reliance on local property taxes as the chief
revenue source for education, enabling a well-to-do town to support a
well-equipped school with relatively little effort, while handicapping its
poor neighbor's effort to raise sufficient funds to support the same kind
of school. (3) According to the criteria developed by Wise, these dispar-
ities have no rational justification. The more well-off schools make no
greater showing of need than the less fortunate; it costs no more to ed-
ucate the students of a richer district than a poorer one. Indeed, quite
the contrary is typically the case: schools in city ghettos, where the cost
of running a school is greatest, have less money available than schools
in the surrounding suburban towns. (4) Therefore, existing modes of
7. THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY: URBAN AND SUBURBAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (C. Daly ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY], is an edited collection of papers
and comments at a University of Chicago Center for Policy Study conference.
8. THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 27.
9. A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OI*
PORTUNITY (1968) [hereinafter cited as RIcr SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS].
10. "[S]evcnteen states have ratios between high and low expenditure classroom units
exceeding 4 to 1; seven of these have ratios of at least 6 to 1. Twenty-five states have
ratios between the 98th and 2d percentiles exceeding 2 to 1, four of these have ratios
exceeding 3 to ." THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 28.
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state support for public education are constitutionally vulnerable. Wise
cites a variety of equal protection decisions-notably those concerned
with the poll tax, indigent criminals, and reapportionment-as judicial
support for his argument.
Wise's thesis, while exciting in its potential, nonetheless raises some
serious questions. One concerns his approach: is his reliance on the ju-
diciary, rather than on the legislature, to remedy the educational in-
equities misplaced? Another deals with theory: what criteria of equal-
ity of educational opportunity can and should be applied? Others bear
on the propriety and the feasibility of the action that Wise suggests be
taken. Will an equalization of educational opportunity that apparently
requires shifting resources from rich to poor communities have an ad-
verse levelling effect, preserving (or creating) mediocrity rather than
stimulating excellence, as a few well-to-do school systems assertedly do?
Philip Kurland's essay, "Equal Educational Opportunity, or the
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined," takes up the first
of these questions."' Kurland doubts the Court's ability to foster sup-
port for this new foray into social engineering, and he questions
whether it has adequate means to enforce decisions requiring finan-
cial disbursements. Yet as Kurland himself notes, the Court has had
considerable success in implementing its indigent criminal and reap-
portionment holdings. Legislators generally have not resisted reappor-
tioning state or congressional districts or providing extensive legal ar-
mament to indigent defendants when obliged to do so by the Court.
Where they have threatened resistance, the Court has had ample means
available to coerce compliance, including staying elections and en-
joining state tax collections and disbursements.
Kurland also questions the desirability of an "equal resources" reso-
lution of the "equal educational opportunity" issue, describing it as
"The Problem of the Wrong Problem."' 2
The real problem is either that there are too many of our school
systems that are undernourished or that the desegregation prob-
lem is not subject to solution so long as local governmental units
exercise autonomy over their school systems. In either case, I don't
expect the solution to be found in a simple rule of equality of ed-
ucational opportunity on a statewide basis.' 3
Wise, however, assumes that "equal resources" is at least one per-
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the absence of equal educational opportunity within a state, as evi-
denced by unequal per-pupil expenditure, may constitute a denial by
the state of the equal protection of the laws."14 When discussing "per-
missible deviations" from the standard, Wise unnecessarily presumes
the "deviation" to be from an "equal resource" standard of equality. 15
He then proceeds to construct legal arguments to support his constitu-
tional position.
For Wise, "legal reasoning ... reasoning by example ... reasoning
from case to case"16 has become a license for holding-hunting and fact
substitution. Thus he offers the legal syllogism: "Discrimination in
education on account of race is unconstitutional. Discrimination in
criminal proceedings on account of poverty is unconstitutional. There-
fore, discrimination in education on account of poverty is unconstitu-
tional."' These premises, he states, reflect the "law of the land." Yet
in fact they so oversimplify that "law" as to render any possible con-
clusion from them almost meaningless. Is discrimination in education
on account of race always unconstitutional, or only when such discrim,
ination (or, better, classification) represents declared state policy? Does
the safeguard against discrimination in criminal proceedings always
guarantee the poor man an attorney when charged with an offense, or
only when charged with a serious offense? Does that safeguard assure
him expert witnesses as proficient as those that more affluent defen-
dants can afford? Does it guarantee him a lawyer as well versed in
criminal practice as one he might hire on the open market? The nega
tive answers that the courts have thus far given to all of these questions
reveal a standard of equality more fragile, a view of discrimination
more ambiguous, than Wise's formulations suggest,1
Wise's apparent inability to perceive the subtleties of the issues he is
dealing with is evidenced not only by his simplified treatment of the
14. RIct ScHooLs, POOR ScnooLs 4 (emphasis added).
15. E.g., id. 135. Despite Wise's arguments, a court that found that ptesent patterns
of educational financing violated the equal protection clause would not necessarily adopt
Wise's "equal resource" measure of equality and ignore other aspects of inequality in
educational opportunity, such as differences in teact ng ability of the teachers. As the
Supreme Court has said elsewhere, "the constitutional command for a state to tilford
'equal protection of the laws' sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application
of a precise formula." Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 582, 550 (1917).
16. E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1948), quoted in TnE QUALITY
OF INEQUALITY 31.
17. Id. 32.
18. See, e.g., Bell v. Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964)(de facto segregation); Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967);
Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965) (no constitutional right to counsel
in all cases); United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968)(competency of court-appointed counsel).
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legal arguments, but also by the way he uses the language and hold-
ings of the reapportionment cases. At one point, he lifts language from
Reynolds v. Sims-"Since the achieving of fair and effective represen-
tation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative appor-
tionment . . . ."19-and sets it down in a hypothetical equal educa-
tional opportunity setting: "Since the achieving of fair and effective
education for all citizens is the basic aim of the state's establishment
of public schooling .. - "20 Yet the criteria for equality suitable to
legislative apportionment differ significantly from those appropriate
for public education. Apportionment concerns voting-a basic politi-
cal right; no costly public good is provided. Furthermore, apportion-
ment admits of a more readily definable and enforceable standard of
equality than public education, if the constitutional standard for equal-
ity of educational opportunity is not equal expenditures per pupil for
every child in the state.2 These differences might lead a court not to
depend on analogies taken from reapportionment cases in deciding
equal educational opportunity suits. Thus, the quality (literally, the
essence or defining characteristics) of equality merits attention.
Furthermore, Wise's insufficient attention to the complexities of de-
fining a measure of equality leaves him vulnerable to the argument
(which Kurland makes) that "equalization" could be constitutionally
required with respect to any public service.22 But courts have per-
mitted communities to choose between different services and have
permitted states to give communities unequal financial support for a
particular public service; it is doubtful that all of these cases will be
overturned. Wise attempts to distinguish other services from education
on the ground that "state constitutions have placed the responsibility
for education on the state. The same cannot be said for the other ser-
vices."23 This response is both inaccurate, for some state constitutions
do vest responsibility for other public services in the state, and beside
the point, for it assumes that the equal protection clause can be ap-
plied to enforce state constitutional mandates, an assumption
that the Supreme Court has never shared.24 Kurland's argument can
19. RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS 182.
20. Id.
21. Even in the apportionment cases, courts have developed the doctrine of "sub-
stantial equality" to uphold schemes in which there was some difference in population
between districts. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247 (D. Wyo. 1964). The
Supreme Court has made similar statements. See, e.g., Roman v. Sinock, 377 U.S. 695.
710 (1964).
22. THE QUALrrY OF INEQUALITY 54.
23. Id. 120. Wise offers a useful review of the statutory and case law which fixes the
responsibility for public education on the state, RIcH SCHOOLS, Poort SCHOoLS 93-118.
24. Kurland, in THE QUALIrY OF INEQUAITY 54.
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be met only by understanding what the common elements are that re-
late the seemingly disparate rights-to equal educational opportunity,
to counsel for an indigent criminal defendant, to an equal vote-and
that do not apply to all government activities. Wise never undertakes
this task. He notes that the indigent criminal cases, such as Griffin v.
Illinois, raise "parallel questions, ' 23 and that the arguments made in
the reapportionment cases are somehow "relevant"20 to an equal
educational opportunity lawsuit. Yet the nature and extent of that par-
allelism, the distinguishing characteristics that yield relevance, the lim-
iting characteristics of what have been termed fundamental rights, all
must be determined if courts are to be persuaded of the soundness of
analogies drawn from such seemingly disparate cases. If the definition
of equal educational opportunity is carefully developed from these
cases, the courts might favorably consider the constitutional argument
based on that definition. Otherwise, the courts might regard the con-
stitutional argument as merely an egalitarian impulse, which they
would be obliged to pursue with respect to all public services.2 1 With-
out a carefully constructed definition, courts are likely to declare that
equality of educational opportunity is a "thicket" too murky to pene-
trate.2
8
Wise's simplistic attempt to establish standards for allocating educa-
tional resources within a state according to a constitutional standard
demonstrates the complexity inherent in defining equality of oppor-
tunity. He lists nine standards, offers no critical analysis of them, and
indicates that these are supposed to be judicial guidelines: the stan-
dards range from a "negative definition-[e]quality of educational op-
portunity exists when a child's educational opportunity does not de-
pend upon either his parents' economic circumstances or his location
within the state"2 9-- to what Wise calls a "full opportunity definition
.... educational resources shall be allocated to every student until he
25. RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS 48.
26. Id. 66.
27. Several attempts at clarification have been made. See, e.g., Kirp, The Poor, the
Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 HARv. EDuc. REV. 635, 639-42 (1968); Hyman & New-
house, Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1965);
McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61
MICH. L. REV. 645 (1963); Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, 59 MIcH. L. REV.
603, 608-09 (1961).
28. While Wise discounts the possibility that an equal educational opportunity stilt
will be dismissed as non-justiciable (RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS 90), the court in Mclnnls
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1969), does in fact hold plaintiff's claim non-justiciable, and the Supreme Court affirmed summarily. See note 6 supra.
29. THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 42 (emphasis omitted); RIcHi ScHOoLs, PooR ScuooL
146.
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reaches the limits imposed by his own capabilities."30 Although these
standards represent possible views of equal opportunity, they are so
imprecise as to provide no guidance to a court anxious to fashion a
rule that is feasible to administer and likely to have beneficial educa-
tional consequences. 31
Wise does deal with a corpus of case and statutory law that can be
used to develop a more compelling constitutional objection to the way
public education is presently financed. But would a reallocation of the
state's education resources in accordance with such a constitutional
standard lead to a measurably better education for children who are
presently underschooled? Or would reshuffling resources only continue
to provide what Eldridge Cleaver has termed a "Higher Uneduca-
tion"? The seminar participants, whose essays were published in The
Quality of Inequality, ignore this issue. Wise does refer to the Cole-
man Report,3 2 a massive study of American schools, but he notes that
its findings have not been universally accepted, and declares that he
will not attempt to resolve this controversy in his paper.33 This side
step conveniently ignores the Coleman Report's central finding:
It appears that variations in the facilities and curriculums of the
schools account for relatively little variation in pupil achievement
insofar as this is measured by standard tests....
The quality of teachers shows a stronger relationship to pupil
achievement....
[A] pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educa-
tional backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in
the school.... [G]hildren from a given family background, when
30. THE QUALITY OF INEQU IAY 42 (emphasis omitted). Compare this definition with
that given in the book: "every person is to be given full opportunity to develop his
abilities to their limit [sic]." RICH SCHOOLS, POOR ScHooLS 148.
31. The other standards that Wise develops are: (1) foundation definition-the state
guarantees to spend a certain minimal amount on each student; 2) minimum attainment
definition--'educational resources [are] allocated to every student until h reaches a
specified level of attainment; (3) leveling definition-"resources (are] allocated in inverse
proportion to students' ability [sic];" (4) competition definition-resources arc allocated
ll direct proportion to each student's ability; (5) equal dollars per pupil definition; (G)
maximum variance ratio definition--"educational resources [are] allocated so that Ihe
maximum discrepancy in per pupil expenditures does not e=ceed a specified ratio"; and
(7) reasonable classification definition-the amount of support that "is regarded as a
'suitable' level of support for a student of specified characteristics is suitable for that
student wherever he lives within the state." THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 43-44. Compare
Wise's more extended discussion of these definitions in Ric ScitooLS. Poor ScooS ch. 8.
at 143-59.
32. J. COLENUAN et al., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPoRTUNrr (1956).
33. THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 42. Moreover, in his book Wise asserts: "even in the
absence of a demonstrated relationship between inputs and outputs, the burden remains
of defending the current variation in educational spending." Ricit SCHooLS, Poot SCHOOLS
141. But, once a rational principle for the state's exercise of its spending power asserted,
the burden to prove its irrationality shifts to those who contest state formae, and here
Coleman's data may be very relevant.
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put in schools of different social composition, will achieve at quite
different levels....
... [T]he principal way in which the school environments ofNegroes and whites differ is in the composition of their student
bodies [and not in the quality of facilities available], and it turns
out that the composition of the student bodies has a strong rela-
tionship to the achievement of Negro and other minority pupils.04
In a seminar examining a proposal to change radically existing public
policy towards education, some attempt should have been made to cope
with the implications of the Coleman Report data, at least to the ex-
tent that it casts doubt on the efficacy of Wise's proposal.
Most of the contributors to The Quality of Inequality appear to ac-
cept Wise's thesis as the new conventional wisdom. Thus, analyses
which view educational financing schemes as but one way of making
schools more useful to the children who attend them are either not
made or only briefly mentioned. Economist Otto Davis's thoughtful
examination of the economic consequences of various changes in pat-
terns of educational financing and control goes undiscussed in the rush
to judicial judgment. 35 The impact of Wise's proposal on community
control of schools is not examined, even though Arthur Mann's intro-
ductory essay provides a brief but incisive history of the thrust to "es-
tablish a community based on ethnic consciousness and pride, and [to]justify such a community as a good thing in itself ...."-30 Edgar Fried-
enberg, whose writings on education are based on schoolchildren's per-
ceptions of their school-world (rather than upon the views of adult
policy-planners),8T admonishes the seminar participants that "you are
middle class partisans with an ideology of your own and ... what will
be best for the changes of other people that will be best for you would
not necessarily be best for them." 38 Wise rejects Friedenberg's com-
ment and the concerns that it suggests; he views his own role more nar-
rowly. "I began with a rather limited objective. That was to propose
an attack on the current method of public school financing. We seem
to be bringing the whole of the educational enterprise into the picture.
34. J. COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 22.35. Davis, Quality and Inequality: Some Economic Issues Related to the Choice ofEducational Policy, in TE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 89. Davis is particularly useful Indescribing the structural changes that his studies of public service preferences indicate
would be necessary in order to equalize resources. "At the very minimum It will be
necessary to abandon local fiscal control," and to change radically the present modes of
raising educational revenues. THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 98.36. Mann, A Historical Overview: the Lumpenproletariat, Education, and Compen.
satory Action, in THE QuAL TY OF INEQUALITY 9, 24.
37. E. FRIENBFER, TuE VANISHING ADOLESCENT (1963); COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA(1965).
38. TnE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY 131 (emphasis in original).
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I am not sure that this is necessary." 30 This limitation of the issues to
be considered is regrettable. It lets Wise insist that "questions of de-
sirability" and "values" are outside his competence. 40 Yet he dearly
sets forth his values at the outset: "I was impelled in this endeavor by
the belief that there is no justification ... for permitting the circum-
stance of parental wealth and geography to determine the quality of a
child's education in the public schools of a state. "41 More importantly,
the limitation prevents him from considering the political impact of
his scheme. Wise is prescribing a "professional" solution to an educa-
tional problem. But in many communities there exists real doubt con-
cerning the feasibility of any educational policy-making undertaken by
professionals for communities, policy-making which carries with it as-
sumptions about what is important about schooling (that children be
equipped to fit into the society's middle class) and how to measure the
success or failure of schooling (through standardized verbal and arith-
metical achievement tests).
There are sound reasons for bringing the kind of judicial action that
Wise proposes. The threat of such a suit might prod a legislature into
developing a different, and hopefully better, resource reallocation
scheme.42 Were the suit to succeed, it is likely (given predictable polit-
ical pressure) that the result would not be merely a reallocation of ex-
isting resources but an absolute increase in state educational expendi-
tures. Furthermore, the consequences of spending more money for
schools attended predominantly by poor and black children-another
likely result of such a suit-would undoubtedly benefit them and their
community. The Coleman Report's measure of the effect of increased
expenditures on education is based on a relatively narrow range of ex-
penditures; it does not consider what would happen if the state spent
two, three, or four times more for public education than it traditionally
has. And increases in expenditures of these magnitudes will probably
be necessary to enable the states to overcome schoolchildren's differ-
ences in background and to move toward providing equally effective
educational opportunity for all their children.
Determining what constitutes equal educational opportunity is cer-
tainly important; a successful suit for equal expenditures per child
39. Id. 134.
40. RIcH SCHoOLs, PooR ScHooLs 209.
41. Id. xi.
42. Robert McKay suggests that the Brown decision served a similar function in
awakening Congress and the American public to "the larger problems of racial discrimi-
nation in the public schools." McKay, Defining the Limits, in Tim Qu.A Ut OF INEQUALtr
77, 81.
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would not only oblige the state to undertake a major reallocation of
its education resources but, more importantly, would require major
changes in administering and teaching in the schools. Unfortunately,
neither The Quality of Inequality nor Rich Schools, Poor Schools pro-
vides the breadth of vision and deft analysis that the issues require.
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